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This thesis defines a methodology that can be used to support a comprehensive 
red-teaming process to assess the technology used during developmental technology. The 
goal is for the U.S. Army to benefit from a repeatable, adaptable method to acquire 
defense systems that are both useful and desirable by operational commands. A 
stakeholder analysis focused on red-team requirements indicated the need to increase 
threat emulation capabilities, provide a quantitative snapshot of technology, and increase 
collaboration between government and industry.  
Based on the methodology recommended by this research, a new, repeatable 
process was initiated by the Adaptive Red Team. This new process offers an improved 
evaluation of developmental technology, which provides a baseline logistics, 
technological and user factors score for each technology, and a better understanding of 
the risk of acceptance for a tested technology. Additional process improvements include 
emulation of formidable threats through equipment; improved tactics, techniques, and 
procedures; and increased collaboration between government and industry through the 
use of data standards, new knowledge of adaptive red-team missions, and technology 
introductions.  
Initial results of applying the recommendations of this thesis have uncovered 
vulnerabilities never seen and when mitigated, have shown to increase operational 
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Red-teaming is a process that is performed on equipment and procedures to 
include forums such as contact proposals, briefings, and operational battle plans. Red-
teaming is typically carried out using critical thinking, alternative analysis, and cultural 
empathy to provide an understanding of the opposing or enemy’s viewpoint as it relates 
to the particular forum under consideration. This opposing viewpoint is used in the 
commercial world to understand the opposition in order to improve the contract proposal 
or briefing by incorporating the red team’s outputs. A similar process is used by the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to codify the opposing viewpoint from the perspective of 
the adversary. This adversarial perspective is traditionally used to develop operational 
battle plans, in effect to counter the red strategy. The DOD red teamers are taught to use 
critical thinking skills to analyze complex issues from a systems perspective and use 
techniques focused on cultural empathy to understand cultural traditions and customs.  
In 2009, the Army created an Adaptive Red Team (ART) as part of the 
Deployable Force Protection Technology Focus Team (DFP TFT). ART was responsible 
for assessing vulnerabilities and limitations in developmental technology that will support 
and protect U.S. military when deployed through the perspective of an adaptable and 
complex enemy. Developmental technology is defined by Langford (2012) as “the 
scientific, mechanical, electronic, or chemical means of improving people’s performances 
or by providing or enhancing their indigenous functions. These improvements provide for 
(1) making better decisions, (2) doing more work faster, and (3) doing work that could 
not be accomplished before by any one individual.” As such, Langford continues, -
”engineering is an enabler to bring technology to people. And, systems engineering 
facilitates life cycle thinking to not only make improvements, but also to achieve 
improvements taking into account life cycle issues, reducing impacts on stakeholders 
(including the environment), and mitigating unintended consequences due to the building, 
operations, or disposal of a product or service” (Langford 119). 
A vulnerability is a weakness in a technology that has the potential to be exploited 
by the enemy and possibly render that technology ineffective for its designed purpose. 
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Vulnerabilities could be as simple as using a cell phone camera to detect an infrared light 
used in night vision equipment, or a more complex electronic attack exploiting a 
weakness in a wireless network. Technological limitations can be discovered by red 
teams when a developer lacks a complete understanding of the operational picture. One 
example of a technology limitation that was discovered by the Adaptive Red Team is of a 
laser technology that is used to detect certain chemical substances in gaseous form at an 
entry point for a combat outpost. The effective range of the laser was only half that 
required for the safe standoff distance to protect against commonly used explosive 
devices. The range limitation meant that the commonly used explosive devices in that 
combat area could have injured the laser operator and destroyed the expensive laser 
detection technology and possibly resulted in further deaths and destruction.  
Adaptive Red Team was designed to be different from the traditional red-teaming. 
The challenge for Adaptive Red Team was how to utilize and adapt red-teaming 
techniques that were developed for assessing operation battle plans to the problems with 
developmental technology. The utilization and adaptation presented a significant 
challenge for the implementers of Adaptive Red Team. This thesis explores how systems 
thinking is used to improve upon an existing red-teaming function that deals with 
developmental technology. The author shows and provides supporting data that 
incorporates systems engineering and systems thinking to address the vulnerability 
analysis and system improvement.  
Adaptive Red Team utilized a process based on field experimentation with existing 
military equipment. Further, the limited red team knowledge about the developmental 
technologies and their general unfamiliarity with the actual equipment compounded the need 
for a repeatable, quantitative methodology to support red-teaming. The first attempt at an 
adapted red-teaming process was marginally effective, lacking both the adaptability and 
flexibility of a truly complex adversary and a repeatable, measurable process.  
Adaptive Red Team utilized systems thinking to create a new adaptable but 
repeatable process to address the stakeholder requirements.  
• Create a repeatable process providing a quantitative snapshot of technology. 
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• Increase threat emulation capabilities in order to uncover additional 
vulnerabilities and system limitations. 
• Increase collaboration between government and Industry. 
These requirements were analyzed, and specific objectives were identified. Those 
objectives tied to specific actions as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Adaptive Red Team Actions with traceability 
Stakeholder Requirements Objective Action 
Repeatable process providing 





Tradespace methodology using 
logistics, tech factors and usability as 
technology acceptance tradespace 
 
 
Increase threat emulation 
capabilities in order to uncover 





Improve Red Cell 
Permanent Red Cell Lead 
Increase Red Cell Training 
Increase Red Cell Threat Equipment 
Increase Red Cell Uniforms and 
Weapons 
Improve Red Cell 
Electronic Attack  
Increase expertise in threat computer 
network security 







Increase collaboration between 






Institute bi-weekly teleconferences to 
increase information flow and 
understating of ART 
Provide two-minute technology 








Institute bi-weekly teleconferences to 
increase information flow and 
understating of ART 
Provide two-minute technology 
introductions at beginning of execution 
week. 
Utilize data format standards for 





The actions indicated in Table 1 were implemented in the new Adaptive Red 
Team process and initial results proved to be positive. Specifically, tradespace 
implementation allowed Adaptive Red Team to provide a quantitative snapshot of 
developmental technology. This quantitative snapshot provided a measurable and 
repeatable method to measure the technologies logistics, technological, and user factors. 
These measurements allow the sponsor to understand the risk and value of technology 
acceptance by soldiers. Threat emulation capabilities were increased by personnel who 
are experts in electronic/computer threat emulation. In addition, Adaptive Red Team 
increased collaboration between government and industry by incorporating a data 
standard. This data standard allowed for all technology with a networked output to be 
displayed on one computer running situational awareness software. This data standard 
allowed for a common operation picture.  
Finally, initial results associated with tradespace methodology, electronic attack 
personnel and common data standards have shown to be favorable. The new Adaptive 
Red Team process with systems thinking is producing initial results that are favorable. 
Those favorable results are on track to be the adaptable, flexible process the Army needs 
to Red Team developmental technology. 
The primary benefit of this thesis to the U.S. Army is to provide a comprehensive 
red-teaming process that is a repeatable, adaptable method for acquiring defense systems 
that are both useful and desirable by U.S. forces.  
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The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology uses the 
Adaptive Red Team (ART) to improve developing technologies, uncover system 
vulnerabilities, and identify mitigations paths in order to increase system effectiveness 
and mission capability (Goerger 2012, 13). These limitation and vulnerabilities are 
discovered through a quarterly field experiment in which commercial and government 
equipment is operated by soldiers during military operations, called scenarios, against an 
enemy. These scenarios allow the equipment to be exposed to enemy tactics, techniques 
and procedures (TTPs). Enemy responses allow the technology developer to understand 
what the enemy may do. The enemy responses provide the developer of equipment with a 
potential path forward for further development. The technology developer is a person or 
group of people inside an organization, both government and industry, who are 
responsible to the stakeholder for the advancement and maturation of a particular 
technology. Each Adaptive Red Team assessment includes 25 technology developers 
selected to be part of an upcoming assessment. The developmental technology that is the 
focus for the scenarios within the assessment is utilized in an operational and realistic 
manner by soldiers executing missions against an enemy that is allowed to be adaptable 
as the situation changes. This primary Adaptive Red Team process provides the 
developer a documented list of vulnerabilities and limitations that they can use as path to 
understanding and mitigation. 
This thesis explores how systems thinking is used to improve an existing red-
teaming function that deals with developmental technology. The author provides 
supporting data that incorporates systems engineering and systems thinking to address the 
vulnerability analysis and system improvement. This thesis introduces a refined Adaptive 
Red Team process.  
From an historical perspective, after the attack on Combat Outpost Keating, it was 
determined by the Army that the sophisticated enemy was able to take advantage of 
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rapidly developed technology that was neither fully integrated into proven Army 
operational use nor fully tested. This technology was rushed to the battlefield in an 
attempt to save lives without fully understanding the vulnerabilities that may have existed 
for an enemy to exploit. Adaptive Red Team was initiated to provide a method to identify 
technology weaknesses though an enemy perspective so that the technology developer is 
made aware and can mitigate the vulnerabilities, in an attempt to prevent another combat 
outpost from being overrun.  
B. BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS 
By defining a comprehensive red-teaming process, the goal is for the Army to 
benefit from a repeatable, adaptable method to acquire defense systems that is both useful 
and desirable by U.S. forces. Defining a repeatable and adaptable process is the scope for 
this thesis. Furthermore, this thesis applies this new process to identify vulnerabilities in 
25 developmental technologies at the rate of one assessment per quarter. Scalability of 
this repeatable and adaptable process (and specifically how it could be applied to a larger 
number of technologies per assessment) is not addressed, but noted to be a desirable next 
step.  
Scalability of the Adaptive Red Team process and methodologies is a topic for 
future research once the basic Adaptive Red Team process and methodologies are 
proven. Scalability is important to the Amy because of the hierarchical organizational 
structure that builds capability from unit level to brigade level through integration of 
forces and processes. This thesis will focus on a small unit (4-16 soldiers) operational 
scenario based on the units assigned to Combat Outpost Keating.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the impacts of the Adaptive Red-teaming methods on the 
developmental technology? 
2. What value does the Adaptive Red Team process provide for developing 
defense technologies? 
3. How does implementing the Adaptive Red-teaming process help DOD 




This thesis seeks to define a comprehensive, quantitative red-teaming process that 
can be used to improve technology development by exposing technology to enemy TTPs 
to help focus corrections to exploitable methods and equipment. The methodology 
proposed for red-teaming is not utilized in formal tests with objectives and thresholds, as 
those are designed around each individual technology. Rather a methodology or process 
that can be used to expose vulnerabilities in all participating technologies is sought.  
The original Adaptive Red Team process that was initiated by DOD and the Army 
in 2009 was part of a legacy program used from previous field experiment experience, 
but that legacy program did not fulfill the desired requirements of the sponsor. The 
following requirements were identified as being unfulfilled.  
1. Create a repeatable process providing a quantitative snapshot of 
technology. 
2. Increase threat emulation capabilities in order to uncover additional 
vulnerabilities and system limitations. 
3. Increase collaboration between government and industry (Goerger 2012, 
13). 
The process used in the original Adaptive Red Team is discussed in Chapter II. 
Implementation of a new process was needed and a systems thinking approach was 
adopted. This new approach led to changes and improvements starting with stakeholder 
guidance on requirements that were not being addressed fully. These system requirements 
provided the basis for this research and from which improvements could be made to the 
existing Adaptive Red Team. These improvements are incorporated into the new methods 
for Adaptive Red Team and initial results are discussed in this thesis.  
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
When a technology is incorporated into (i.e., “attends”) an Adaptive Red Team 
assessment and a list of potential vulnerabilities for the equipment being tested is 
generated, system limitations are discovered. The purpose for Adaptive Red Team is to 
assure that the development system under assessment will mitigate those vulnerabilities 
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and provide for a less vulnerable and more capable technology that can be deployed to 
operational units. At the outset, it is assumed that the new procedures incorporated into 
Adaptive Red Team will be more effective than the old system of red-teaming. That 
assumption is tested through notional feedback through the assessment results, informal 
discussions with the participants, and a general perception of the efficiency of assessment 
planning and execution.  
Further, it is assumed that if collaboration is increased, the government will 
ultimately use better products. Those better products may include more feature sets in a 
particular technology or enhancing current feature sets with better algorithms or other 
analysis tools from a different vendor. There are no plans to test this premise as part of 
either this thesis or as a recommendation. Consider this premise to be a baseline principle 
from which the red-teaming work is built and enacted.  
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION  
This thesis describes a process used by the Adaptive Red Team to identify 
vulnerabilities in developmental technologies. This process was modified though 
stakeholder interactions and identification of deficiencies in the outcome. Systems 
engineering principles were used to decompose those deficiencies and modify the process 
starting in Chapters V and VI. That modified process provided initial results discussed in 





A. RED TEAMS 
According to Defense Science Board, “red teams and red-teaming processes are 
tools and techniques that have long been used by Government and Industry in order to 
reduce risk and increase opportunities,” (Defense Science Board 2003, 2). Commercial 
enterprises use red-teaming as a way to prepare for a client presentation, play the side of 
the government for a contract proposal, or to capture what the competitor or “other side” 
may be thinking. Once the presenter or proposal team has an understanding of what the 
other side is potentially thinking, they may modify their strategy, their tactics, their 
documents, or their product offerings to accommodate the insight and additional 
knowledge. This approach to thinking about the opposition is fundamental to systems 
engineering and systems thinking and has been in widespread general use for the past 40 
years. Red-teaming has a long history of use by the Army (University of Foreign Military 
and Cultural Studies 2012) and has spread to the Operational Communities, Joint 
Agencies, as well as Interagency Organizations. However, after years of ad hoc methods 
that were bound to heuristics (Langford 2012, 19), the first Red-teaming Handbook was 
published by the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) in 2006. 
Since 2006, the Red-teaming Handbook has been revised many times to include new 
insights and maturing concepts (University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies 
2012). 
As the Handbook states, “UFMCS red teams are taught strategies and techniques 
to avoid common problems such as avoiding group think, mirror imaging, cultural 
ignorance, and tunnel vision” (1).  
After more than 40 years of use, red-teaming is accepted and practiced as an 
effective method to analyze operational plans from a military organization. Red teams are 
also effective in analyzing corporate briefing or large contract proposals. The key tenet of 
red-teaming is consistent across all domains—look at the battle plan from the perspective 
of the enemy or its equivalent for a proposal from the perspective of the receiving 
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agency. Organizations use the red team’s output to make a more effective product. 
However, the techniques taught at UFMCS are not intended to be used to red team 
developmental technology. To broaden the use of red-teaming taught at UFMCS, this 
thesis discusses the revisions, methods, and general results for developmental technology. 
B. ADAPTIVE RED TEAM 
October 3, 2009, the Battle of Kamdesh took place in Afghanistan on Combat 
Outpost Keating. This battle was one of the deadliest battles on a small outpost in U.S. 
history. Eight Americans were killed and 27 wounded during that fight while up to 350 
Taliban fighters partially overran the combat outpost (Seavey 2015, 1). This small 
combat outpost was in a remote part of Afghanistan and surrounded by difficult to defend 
terrain. These Taliban fighters were extremely diligent in their preparation and attention 
to detail when planning the attack and exploited many gaps in U.S. defenses and took 
advantage of some vulnerabilities to create this devastating blow to Combat Outpost 
Keating.  
The overrun of Combat Outpost Keating overrun in Afghanistan led the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Army to develop a technology focused Red Team. In 
2009, a red team was stood up by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering (ASD (R&E)) with support from Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Research and Technology as part of the Deployable Force Protection Technology Focus 
Team (DFP TFT). OSD was responsible for initiating this effort but funding and program 
execution was provided by Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics 
and Technology (ASA(ALT)) 
DFP TFT was a larger program focused on small base challenges and technology 
development to support those challenges in a rapid manner. Added was a separate red-
teaming component to help mature specific technologies that had been put into 




The mission of the Adaptive Red Team is to support the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics & Technology efforts to 
enable the soldier by identification of potential vulnerabilities in 
developmental technologies including performance degradation in 
contested environments, interoperability, adaptability and training/ease of 
use through live experiment venues designed to improve soldier 
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III. ADAPTIVE RED TEAM 
The Adaptive Red Team execution team was originally made up of four 
personnel. The team included the team manager, event coordinator, operations lead, and 
data collection lead. The manager was responsible for developing and executing the plan 
to conduct four quarterly Adaptive Red Team events know as vulnerability assessments. 
This plan includes sponsor interactions, budget plan and execution, contractual 
interactions, and program briefings. The event coordinator was responsible for executing 
the manager’s plan as it pertains to the details of orchestrating all activities necessary to 
conduct a vulnerability assessment. These activities included coordination of military 
base range operations, radio frequency spectrum clearance, maintaining quarterly task 
schedules, and coordination of planning meetings. A full-time active duty Army National 
Guardsman served as the operations lead and is responsible for maintaining soldier 
support for each event—planning out the roles and responsibilities for personnel 
conducting the scenario, developing the scenarios, and running the U.S. Forces 
operations center. The final member of the original execution team was the data 
collection lead. This person had the responsibility of establishing a base line list of 
questions for each technology, assigning additional data collectors for each technology, 
and managing the report process. Each member of the original Adaptive Red Team had a 
unique responsibility on the execution team and all team members pulled together to 
assist each other when necessary.  
The Adaptive Red Team’s execution team was asked to perform the Adaptive Red 
Team mission based on their previous field experiments for Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM). This fieldwork was desired by the sponsor in order to begin with 
an experienced team that understood field experimentation. The field experimentation 
experience provided the execution team an understanding of how to invite industry to 
participate legally, organize a group of technology developers for a common goal, and 
how to incorporate soldiers into field experimentation.  
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However, this field experience provided only part of the needs for success as an 
Adaptive Red Team. Since the execution team did not have any knowledge or experience 
in red-teaming, they needed an understanding of general red-teaming methods before 
they could execute an Adaptive Red Team effectively for the sponsor.  
The need for general knowledge of red-teaming was addressed in 2010 by 
attending a course from the Army Combined Arms Center called Critical Thinking for 
Red Team Practitioner. This two-week course familiarized the execution team with 
critical thinking skills, cultural empathy, and groupthink mitigation strategies to help 
challenge assumptions and consider alternative perspectives in support of better decision 
making (University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies 2012).  
The training provided a general background and understanding of red-teaming as 
it is applied to staff who implement red team military operational plans. The skills and 
strategies taught in this critical thinking course were considered to be good skills to have 
when participating in an operational organization that develops battle plans for a unit’s 
execution. This thesis research reinforces that assumption.  
The Adaptive Red Team was created to assess vulnerabilities and system 
limitations in developmental technologies. However, the Adaptive Red Team was not 
concerned about operational plans (as were emphasized in the mobile course). For 
example, traditional red teamers, as taught, will care that a military organization 
destroyed a bridge in a battle after they crossed but that may not be a culturally 
acceptable tactic. Knowing the ultimate use of the course materials, the attendees from 
the Adaptive Red Team translated their needs through the perspective of the course 
materials to improve relevance and understanding of the course.  
To date, the training and experience has allowed the team to conduct vulnerability 
assessments using soldiers emulating enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures. The 
Adaptive Red Team challenge has been to weave together red-teaming concepts that were 
designed for operational plans and use so they can be used on technology development.  
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IV. ADAPTIVE RED TEAM OVERVIEW OF OLD PROCESS 
A. ORGANIZATION  
The organization of the Adaptive Red Team is based on semi-autonomous cells 
performing individual functions. Within each cell, each member or teams of members 
perform a particular subfunction. In this manner, the top-level functions that must be 
carried out are divided  cells, in a fashion similar to functional decomposition used in 
systems engineering to that leads to a work breakdown structure. Commensurate with the 
systems engineering functional decomposition, the associated processes and activities are 
carried out by members of the cells.  
The three cells used for the execution of an Adaptive Red Team are the white, 
blue, and red cells. The white cell has the function of data collection. The blue cell has 
the function of equipment training and planning/executing the operational scenarios that 
represent U.S. forces. Lastly, the red cell has the function of threat emulation. During the 
execution of an assessment, each cell is provided additional support personnel through 
the actions of execution team. The execution team utilizes their leadership positions and 
networks to provide support from other government research facilities and operational 
units.  
1. White Cell 
The data collection effort is performed by the white cell and the lead data 
collector from the execution team becomes the white cell lead for the execution of this 
function. Each data collection team from white cell is comprised of two team members: 
an engineer/scientist and a soldier performing this subfunction. The data collection teams 
are each assigned three technologies and are responsible for collecting performance data 
to support their assigned technologies throughout the assessment week.  
The engineer/scientist data collectors include representatives from many 
governmental organizations. Soldiers from various branches of the military are also 
included as part of the two-person white cell data collection team. This combination of 
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technical experts with operational users allows the engineering/science to be understood, 
communicated, and assessed in the context of operational uses. 
Assessments are categorized as discovery or operational.  
• Discovery assessments: Each technology is assessed as a standalone 
capability to understand the technologies 
capabilities/limitations/vulnerabilities as presented.  
• Operational Assessments: Technologies are assessed during operational 
scenarios that are conducted by soldiers assigned to blue and red cells 
discussed below. These scenarios are designed to stretch the operational 
limitations of the technology and uncover how well the technology performs 
against enemy actions. Scenarios are conducted several times each day and are 
based on real world missions that the Army conducts.  
2. Blue Cell 
Blue cell is responsible for the development and execution of all operational 
scenarios and operational feedback. The lead for operations on the execution team leads 
the blue cell. Blue cell is augmented by additional soldiers from support units that have 
been placed on orders to participate by the execution team. The Blue cell lead is a senior, 
non-commissioned officer (NCO) with many Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, and many other counties working on combat 
outposts and other smaller remotes bases. Blue cell leadership organizes the supporting 
soldiers by the units and experience. Soldiers are organized into squads, each with a 
squad leader and approximately five soldiers. The rank of each squad member ranges 
from E-2 through E-6. This variety of rank allows a different perspective to be 
incorporated into the assessments of the scenarios.  
Blue cell squad members are trained on a specific technology that they will use 
when executing the scenarios. Technology developers provide this training. The training 
function is discussed in Section B2. Blue cell squad members execute the missions in the 
scenarios, then provide feedback in the after-action reviews.  
Operational scenarios are a method for each technology participant (if desired) to 
have a soldier train on the equipment and use it during a tactical mission(s) called a 
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scenario. This set of activities is enacted with the expectation that the majority of the 
vulnerabilities will be discovered. 
3. Red Cell 
Red cell provides the threat emulation and acts as the enemy force for each 
scenario. Red cell members perform roles such as farmers or shop keepers. These roles 
each have a unique set of actions that are performed based on the scenarios being 
executed. Farmers could be used to place or carry explosives and shopkeepers could be 
selling stolen merchandise from blue cell or watching base activity for pattern of life.  
This cell is led by a government civilian that supports Adaptive Red Team, but 
this lead is not part of the execution team. The red cell lead has over thirty years’ 
experience in SOF and related small unit missions both from a planning and execution 
perspective. Red cell is augmented by soldiers from various organizations. Typically, this 
cell has eight to 15 people on the team, depending on the physical terrain and operational 
area planned in the scenario.  
Red cell is organized to accommodate various scenarios. Sometimes red cell is 
structured like a village with a very specific key leader. Other times the red cell is 
organized into two person teams or single individuals acting as sheepherders, farm 
workers, or shop workers. These different organizational structures allows red cell to 
expose the technology to different enemy TTPs.  
The rank of each red cell member varies slightly, but typically the higher ranking, 
more experience soldiers are assigned to red cell. All assigned red cell members receive 
training form the red cell lead on how to execute enemy TTPs effectively.  
B. ASSESSMENTS 
1. Discovery Assessment 
The discovery function is performed by the two-person data collection team from 
white cell. This team has a generic list of questions that are the general starting point for a 
technology discussion carried out by the white cell teams. These assessments provide a 
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baseline of each technology and its performance characteristics in the context of different 
scenarios. The list of questions is the starting point in the discussions with the technology 
developers. The questions are geared to provide an understating of the following areas: 
technology, form factor, connectivity, reliability, user interface, training, and 
sustainability. Sample discovery assessment questions used: 
1. What is field of view and resolution of this option?  
2. Is it a cooled imager? If so, can the enemy detect the cooler noise? 
3. How is the system transported? Any material handling equipment 
requirements?  
4. How can the system be setup and operated at night?  
2. Operational Assessment 
Technology performance in the operational scenarios conducted by blue cell and 
red cell is called the operational assessment. This operational assessment is performed by 
the white cell data collectors assigned to each technology. White cell teams perform this 
function by a combination of techniques from watching performance in the operations 
center, blue cell interviews, red cell interviews, and participation in the after action 
reviews. Typical questions asked by white cell members include: 
1. Through the use of the technology, did blue cell notice red cell activities 
that were meant to be clandestine? 
2. Did red cell interpret blue bell activities? 
3. Did red cell breach the outer perimeter? 
4. Were red cell communications detected? 
Operational assessments are a method for each technology developer to have a 
soldier train on the equipment and use it during a tactical mission(s) called a scenario. 
This technique results in the discovery of the majority of the vulnerabilities. The training 
function only happens if the participant wishes to pursue inclusion in the scenarios. 
Training time is limited and varies for each technology. This limitation is a realistic 
constraint based on soldier feedback from previous participation. When soldiers are 
deployed, time is a very precious resource, and when a personnel rotation is underway, 
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everything becomes more difficult, including training on systems that the incoming unit 
has never seen before. The departing soldier must train his/her replacement in a limited 
amount of time while still performing the daily duties and getting ready for departure. 
This change is called rotation of personnel/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA). Adaptive 
Red team simulates RIP/TOA by limiting the time a participant has to train soldiers, 
which allows the participant to understand the complexities associated with RIP/TOA. 
Understanding this issue allows the participant to address with quick start guides, videos, 
and segmented software (easy/advanced), color-coding cables, or some other issue 
learned during the training and scenario debriefings.  
Once fully trained on the equipment, the soldier now has control of the 
technology and begins to prepare for movement. This experience allows the soldier to 
pack the equipment in his/her rucksack and prepare for the mission. The load out of 
equipment also proves to be a valuable lesson for developers, as many do not understand 
what other essential mission items go into a rucksack with space at a premium.  
Operational scenario participation exposes technology weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities that would not normally be discovered in a laboratory environment 
because soldiers do stress the technological limits and sometimes use the technology in 
unintended ways. Systems engineers describe this behavior as emergence.  
C. ADAPTIVE RED TEAM ASSESSMENTS VENUE LOCATION 
The origin of the DFP TFT and creation of the Adaptive Red Team was based on 
Combat Outpost Keating being overrun. Deployable force protection TFT focus was on 
enhancing technology that could be used to protect small bases less than 300 personnel.  
Afghanistan has 652,230 square kilometers (CIA , 1) and is slightly smaller than 
Texas. This landlocked country has the Hindu Kush mountain range that runs northeast to 
southwest dividing the country. This mountain range creates a terrain that can be difficult 
to protect but also provides long flat open terrain in specific areas. War strategy dictates 
the locations of outposts and not one outpost is identical to another.  
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Adaptive Red Team execution team use information from the operations lead and 
stakeholders to guide selection of the assessment venue and organize accordingly. 
Adaptive Red Team prefers venues that have already built structures such as exterior 
walls and entry control points as a way of mimicking the terrain of Afghanistan. 
Camp Roberts National Guard Base in California has an existing outpost that the 
military regularly uses as they prepare for deployment. This outpost is located among 
rolling hills, open plains, and distant mountains. The weather can be similarly hot and 
dry. The Camp Roberts site was chosen as the primary assessment venue location 
because of its terrain and existing outpost structure, such as guard towers, walls, entry 
control points, and wooden buildings.  
 
Figure 1.  Camp Roberts National Guard Base—Replica Combat Outpost  
D. SCENARIOS 
Scenarios are conducted during daylight hours and are where the red cell and blue 
cell come together to provide a feedback to the data collection team on system 
performance and how the technology performed against the enemy. Scenarios are the 
setting for the operational assessments that white cell undertake. Adaptive Red Team 
establishes a sequence of operational activities prior to execution, which provide a 
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logical, realistic progression of scenarios in a hostile area. Blue cell executes the 
scenarios and utilizes realistic mission statements providing the commander’s intent.  
The operational missions that are provided in the mission statements are chosen 
based on the technology selected for each assessment. An example of a realistic mission 
that blue cell performs in enemy territory on the outpost is entry control point (ECP) 
operations. Entry-control point operations are where blue cell members operate an entry 
control point of the combat outpost using a variety of specific technology selections. This 
entry area serves as the primary entrance for all personnel on the outpost and allows for 
realistic flow of personnel when performing the scenario. Red cell members are 
intermingled into the flow of personnel entering. This intermingling allows the blue cell 
soldier who is operating the equipment a realistic approach used by the enemy. Red cell 
members sometimes hide suspicious packages or other devices in some manner based on 
enemy TTPs. This entry-control point activity becomes progressively more difficult to 
detect based on decreasing the size and location of the suspicious package, number of red 
cell member’s incoming, and stacking of red personnel with unsuspecting personnel to 
mask the suspicious device during entry.  
E. OLD PROCESS OVERVIEW 
The initial process for the execution team was the same process used in the 
previous field experiments for Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Based on 
guidance provided by the sponsor, Adaptive Red Team assessments were scheduled to 
take place quarterly. This quarterly schedule allowed the execution team to properly plan 
and execute each weeklong assessment.  
Industry and government submit the proper documents for attendance. Industry 
submits to a request for information (RFI). That RFI is the Adaptive Red Team’s legal 
mechanics to invite Industry to a government-funded assessment. This RFI is published 
on Federal Business Opportunities (FEDBIZOPPS) website with instructions for how to 
submit, submission deadlines, and where to submit are provided. Technology developed 
by the government must be accompanied by a quad chart for each technology that is 
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solicited through a “call for data.” This data call is sent in a quarterly email from 
ASA(ALT) to the research and development commands leadership. Those commands are 
responsible for research and development of future Army technology and when 
applicable to Adaptive Red Team scope they will respond to that email by submitting a 
quad chart to the execution team to be considered for selection in the upcoming Adaptive 
Red Team assessment.  
The outcome for each Adaptive Red Team assessment is to identify technological 
limitations and vulnerabilities in those technologies selected to participate with the intent 
that the technology developers from both government and Industry will invest resources to 
mitigate those vulnerabilities. Adaptive Red Team neither provides any funding to the 
participating developers (government or industry) that are selected to attend nor does 
Adaptive Red Team provide funding for vulnerability mitigation. This funding is outside 
scope of Adaptive Red Team mission. 
1. Adaptive Red Team Planning 
Two planning meetings are conducted each quarter and led by the execution team, 
as show in the Figure 2. The first is the initial planning meeting to select the technologies 
that have been submitted, select operational mission that are to be incorporated into the 
scenarios, initial threat TTPs, and any modifications to the generic data collection 
questions that will be used by white cell members. The second, final planning meeting 
addresses technology withdraws after selection, any scenario modifications, and 




Figure 2.  Old Adaptive Red Team process (from Gilkes and Klopfenstein 2014, 
3–5) 
The outputs of the initial planning meeting are a list of 25 technologies selected 
for the upcoming Adaptive Red Team assessment, initial data collection questions for 
white cell, and initial list of scenarios and enemy TTPs that will be used by blue and red 
cells. The outputs of the final planning meeting are the final list of technology quad 
charts, final list of scenarios to be executed and enemy TTPs that will be incorporated 
into the scenarios.  
All technologies selected are informed of their acceptance and those not selected 
are also notified. Representatives associated with the selected technologies are asked to 
participate in bi-weekly teleconferences to gain a better understating of the Adaptive Red 
Team process and approach to technology assessments. Schedules, maps, and an initial 
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technology layout showing developers initial setup locations are briefed on the 
teleconferences.  
2. Adaptive Red Team Execution  
The middle of Figure 2 outlines the steps that occur during execution week as 
setup, day operations, and end of day after action reviews. Setup begins on Saturday prior 
to the execution week in order to ready the combat outpost for the developers who arrive 
on Monday.  
During setup, a tent is utilized as the blue cell tactical operations center. This 
operations center serves as the command post for all blue activities. When applicable to 
the technology, its information is transmitted over a wired and wireless network back to 
the operations center for utilization in the scenarios for tactical decisions.  
The following Monday is the first meeting with all technology developers present. 
A range safety briefing is given to all in attendance, and an Adaptive Red Team overview 
and a picture briefing of what it is like to live on a small combat outpost by a recently 
deployed soldier is provided. This picture briefing helps developers understand the 
limitations and challenges of living in a remote outpost. For example, developers 
sometimes think a soldier has ready access to all tools required for assembly of their 
technology or that if a fastener is dropped when putting something together, the soldier can 
just go get another one. This picture briefing is an effort to raise awareness of those 
challenges in order to motivate developers to incorporate innovative solutions that address 
the challenges. After the Monday meetings, all developers gather equipment and begin 
initial setup. This initial setup begins the data collection discovery assessments, which are 
performed by white cell members. 
At the end of every day, an after action review (AAR) is conducted to discuss the 
day’s events. The AAR agenda includes administrative comments by execution team 
followed by the blue cell, red cell, white cell, and then each technology. White cell lead 
makes sure all technologies have met their data collection team, while blue and red cells 
discuss the scenarios that were executed that day. Each soldier speaks about the technology 
on which they were trained, and how well it performed during the specific missions. As the 
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blue cell soldiers provide feedback, red cell members describe the TTPs they used and how 
effective they were from a red perspective, if known. Blue cell soldiers fill in the gaps on the 
red TTPs effectiveness. All of this information is captured by the appropriate white cell data 
collection team and, if addition clarification is required, a separate interview with blue and/or 
red cell is conducted. After the AAR, technology developers have an opportunity to share 
any significant accomplishments of the day. Figure 3 below represents the old Adaptive Red 
Team execution process and how all the cells interacted. Discovery assessments are executed 
by the white cell data collection teams on each assigned technology. When each data 
collection team successfully answers the list of questions in the data collection plan, the 
technology is allowed to proceed to the scenarios. The technology is provided by the 
developer to the blue cell for operation in the scenario. Blue cell soldiers operate the 
technology in the scenario to understand the operational effectiveness against the red cell. 
Subsequent scenarios for each particular technology will become progressively more 
complex. This complexity allows the red cell members to become more aggressive and 
adaptive using evasion techniques to resist detection or cover and concealment to slip past a 




Figure 3.  Old Adaptive Red Team Execution (from Gilkes and Klopfenstein 
2014, 3–5) 
The execution team leveraged a previous process, combined with some red-teaming 
concepts learned during a two-week red-teaming course, to develop and implement the 
process outlined above. This process was ineffective and did not meet the sponsors’ 
requirements to provide an adaptable, repeatable process used to assess technology 
limitations and vulnerabilities through the perspective of an adaptive and complex enemy. A 
new process was needed to meet this requirement.  
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V. SYSTEM THINKING APPROACH  
In order to execute fully an Adaptive Red Team mission per the stakeholders’ 
guidance, a new process had to be established based on systems engineering principles. 
This new process needed to take into account the following stakeholder requirements:  
• Create a repeatable process that provides a quantitative snapshot of 
technology. 
• Increase threat emulation capabilities in order to uncover additional 
vulnerabilities and system limitations. 
• Increase collaboration between government and industry. 
The requirements are addressed individually to provide an actionable path 
forward that can be executed.  
A. REPEATABLE PROCESS PROVIDING A QUANTITATIVE SNAPSHOT 
OF TECHNOLOGY 
When engineers begin a project, many design approaches, methods and materials 
are traditionally considered. Those approaches are called tradeoffs. Some tradeoffs may 
include material choice, selection of components, others may include button layout and 
titles in a graphical user interface (GUI) and, finally, some tradeoffs may include types of 
encryption or methods of data exfiltration. The boundaries of those tradeoffs delineate 
and are considered the tradespace.  
The Adaptive Red Team execution team created a process called the tradespace 
methodology to assess a technology’s current development state and level of alignment 
with soldier expectations that influence successful fielding and acceptance. The tradespace 
methodology employs science and engineering expertise, coupled with hands on soldier 
training, system use, and operational observations during scenarios, to estimate the 
potential value return and potential risk of technology based on the scoring of specific 
factors.  
The factors, shown in Figure 4, are examined when the tradespace methodology is 




Figure 4.   Tradespace Methodology Decomposition 
(from Klopfenstein and Tober 2014, 107–122) 
After many discussion with soldiers, feedback from recently deployed soldiers, 
and discussion among the Adaptive Red Team execution team, the top-level factors and 
subfunctions were defined for technology acceptance by soldiers.  
The logistics supportability factor is designed to assess a technologies operation 
readiness and the components, procedures, and transportation required to remain 
operational. The subfactors associated with logistics supportability include response to 
malfunctions (Log Factor 1), routine maintenance (Log Factor 2), support planning (Log 
Factor 3), repair and replacement parts (Log Factor 4), setup (Log Factor 5), and 
transportation requirements (Log Factor 6).  
As an example, Log Factor 1: response to malfunctions is further broken down to 
the bulleted list below with a specific list of answers for each. Answers are selected based 
on white cell data collection teams’ interaction with technology developers, blue cell who 
used the technology in scenarios, and red cell who opposed it.  
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• Log Factor 1—response to malfunctions 
o required location for troubleshooting/repair 
o tools required to troubleshoot/repair 
o skills required to troubleshoot/repair 
o added risk to soldier by performing troubleshooting/repair 
Discussions about the above factors determine the score to Log Factor 1—
response to malfunctions.  
Technological factors are designed to capture the actual performance as observed 
based on developer’s stated capabilities, and how adaptable, secure, and robust.  
The subfactors associated with technological include observed performance (Tech 
Factor 1), adaptability (Tech Factor 2), integration into common operational picture 
(Tech Factor 3), digital security (Tech Factor 4), and environmental robustness (Tech 
Factor 5).  
Tech Factor 1: observed performance is further broken down into the bulleted list 
below, with a specific list of discussions for each. Answers are selected based on the 
white cell data collection teams’ interaction with technology developers, blue cell who 
used the technology in scenarios, and red cell who opposed it.  
• Tech Factor 1—observed performance 
o comparison to stated capability from developers submitted paperwork 
Ten answers are available for the stated capability allowing a direct correlation to 
a number score of one to ten for Tech Factor 1.  
The user factor is designed to assess a technologies ease of use and understanding 
of the output. The subfactors associated with user factor include training burden (User 
Factor 1), required type of user (User Factor 2), ease of use (User Factor 3), and 
interpreting the output (User Factor 4).  
User Factor 1: training burden is further broken down to the bulleted list below 
with a specific list of answers for each. Answers are selected based on white cell data 
collection teams’ interaction with technology developers, blue cell who used the 
technology in scenarios, and red cell who opposed it. 
26 
 
• User Factor 1—training burden 
o type of trainer required 
o geographic location of required training 
o required time to train  
Answers to the above will determine the score to User Factor 1, training burden. 
Each log factor, technical factor and user factor have a set of information to be 
collected; above are just examples of one factor per area.  
The information for each factor is translated into numerical values, or factor 
scores, as each white cell data collector first assigns a most likely (ML) score to 
communicate their estimate of the current system state on a particular factor after 
analyzing all available information. Recognizing both the limited interaction time and the 
developmental nature of many of the technologies participating at Adaptive Red Team, 
each data collector assigns estimated low (EL) and estimated high (EH) scores that 
bracket each factor ML score. These numerical scores are used to capture the level of 
individual uncertainty associated with a reported factors ML score. 
All of the subfactors scores are averaged into one numerical value for each factor. 
For example, all six subfactors scores for factor logistics supportability are averaged to 
formulate a single ML score per data collector for logistics supportability. This averaging 
process is applied to the ML, EL and EH values and provides a three separate scores for 
logistics, technological, and user factors.  
All technologies at an Adaptive Red Team event are combined into one spider 
chart. The spider chart segregates the average ML scores for each factor (technical, 
logistic, and user) to expose potential strengths along with possible risks requiring 
mitigation. All tradespace factors are converted to a percentage; for example, a score of 
6.1 will become 61% in the spider chart. The higher the percentage per factor, it is 
assumed each technology is less vulnerable.  
The second output of the tradespace methodology is a whisker plot that represents 
the range of uncertainty from best case high score (EH) to worst case low score (EL) per 
technology across all data collectors scores. The EH score is used at the top end for the 
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range of uncertainty and the EL is used to define the end point on the range of 
uncertainty. The EH and EL scores are used to represent the range of uncertainty for each 
subfactor’s ML score.  
B. INCREASE THREAT EMULATION CAPABILITIES  
The primary stakeholder determined that the ART process lacked desired threat 
emulation capabilities. This lack of capabilities was not allowing Adaptive Red Team to 
adequately emulate the threat and meant technologies were not exposed fully to adaptive 
and complex threats.  
Adaptive Red Team addresses this stakeholder requirement by several methods, 
including additional red cell training, hiring additional experts, and increasing threat 
equipment. Table 1 below outlines the objectives needed to accomplish the goal of 
increase threat emulation capabilities.  




Increase Threat Emulation 
Capabilities 
Assign Permanent Red Cell Lead 
Obtain Ethical Hackers 
Obtain Electronic Warfare (EW) Experts  
Design/Purchase Threat Equipment  
Utilize Threat Uniforms/Weapons 
Training to become a red cell lead is provided by Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) Operational Force (OPFOR) academy, which leads to certification 
as a red cell expert. This training provides a process for specific threat systems and this 
process helps set the stage for all Adaptive Red Team red cell activities. The process is 
flexible to allow red cell adjustments in the complexity of red cell activity for the 
scenarios, which adds adaptability and complexity to the scenarios and Adaptive Red 
Team process.  
Subject matter experts can be added to the team to provide specific expertise as 
required. For example, support for understanding the ethical hacker and electronic 
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warfare expertise may be outside the domain expertise of red team members. The ethical 
hackers are considered computer network security experts (CNS) that are specifically 
geared to understand and utilize enemy software, hardware, and TTPs. The open source 
software and commercial hardware from many foreign countries are the tools that many 
hackers across the world use every day to discover system exploits, passwords, or other 
vulnerabilities.  
For example, a CNS team has the ability to assess vulnerabilities in the enterprise 
network, webservers, satellite communications, unmanned vehicle command and control, 
encryption (AES 256/WEP. WPA2), smart phones/tablets, and social media networks.  
These vulnerabilities can be identified by such things as denial of service, man in 
the middle attacks, rootkits, and Trojans.  
A denial of service (DoS) attack is when a hacker prevents users from accessing 
specific services. This threat is accomplished by attacking your computer and network or 
the computer and network from the service you are trying to obtain by effectively 
overloading the communications media making legitimate traffic difficult to reach the 
intended destination.  
Man in the middle attacks are when a hacker gets between a legitimate user and 
the regular flow of information. This hacker is now in the middle of the communication 
stream and has the ability to “see” all traffic flow. This information may contain 
passwords, location of friendly troops, sensors positons, or other sensitive information.  
A rootkit is a collection of software that when installed as a regular user enables 
administrator level access. This technique upgrades administrator access to allow a 
hacker to gain additional access to different computers, servers or other networks only 
assessable my administrators.  
Trojans are designed to appear as useful software but will cause damage when 
installed on a computer. Trojans vary in damage and some may delete files or others will 
rearrange your desktop. This vulnerability leaves computers and the networks they access 
open to complete take over and control leaving all data compromised.  
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Electronic warfare experts in threat technologies can be obtained to address 
vulnerabilities in radio frequency (RF) based technologies. These experts look for 
vulnerabilities in the RF spectrum by techniques such as low power jamming, high power 
jamming (when applicable), off center frequency jamming, and waveform manipulation.  
Jamming is accomplished on technology that communicates through the RF 
spectrum. This communication is done by creating a waveform on or close to the center 
frequency on a signal generator and broadcasting that signal back to the technology being 
assessed. Low power jamming is accomplished by little to no signal amplification and 
high power uses amplification. Off-center jamming occurs by creating a waveform that is 
a specific frequency offset from the center and then broadcast back to the technology 
being assessed.  
Waveform manipulation is a technique where RF data is recorded from the target 
device. This recoded waveform can then be manipulated using software to adjust specific 
parameters of the waveform in an effort to trigger the technology being assessed or 
possibly mask a trigger.  
Technologies respond to different techniques in different manners as some are 
compromised, while others are not, depending on the level or hardening, shielding, and 
electrical design.  
To address threat equipment and weapons, the execution team with additional 
input from previously deployed soldiers, formulates a list of the most likely equipment 
used against a combat outpost. 
Table 2.   Common Threat Equipment Used and Purpose  
Threat Equipment/Weapons Purpose 
GPS Jammers Disrupt GPS Signals 
Mobile Phone Jammers Disrupt Mobile Phones 
AK-47 Realistic Targets  




Low powered GPS jammers and mobile phone jammers would be designed and 
built by the adversary’s EW experts. These threat technologies will be utilized by red cell 
in scenarios in order to discover vulnerabilities of assessed blue cell technologies 
previously not being accessed.  
Threat weapons can be purchased from a vendor specifically selling accurate, 
non-operational replicas of threat weapons. These weapons have the same look, feel, 
weight, and other properties of originals, but they are just not fully functional. These 
targets will be used by red cell in the scenarios and assist specific technologies in weapon 
detection and identification. The realistic nature will allow red cell to be creative in its 
deception techniques using the red force (enemy) TTPs.  
The threat equipment and realistic weapons will add a layer of realism and 
adaptability not previously part of the Adaptive Red Team process. These additions allow 
the Adaptive Red Team to increase complexity of scenarios and uncover additional 
vulnerabilities and satisfy the remaining part of the requirement to increase threat 
emulation capabilities.  
C. INCREASE COLLABORATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT 
AND INDUSTRY 
Adaptive Red Team execution team looks for ways to both increase collaboration 
and decrease barriers to collaboration with industry and government developers. 
Collaboration is an approach that describes two or more technology developers working 
together to increase each developers capabilities. If collaboration is increased, the 
government should be able to get better products by including more feature sets in a 
particular technology, or enhancing current feature sets with better algorithms, or using 
other analysis tools from a different company other than those that are participating in 
Adaptive Red Team.  
1. Barriers to Collaboration 
One barrier to collaboration in the old Adaptive Red Team process for technology 
developers was what the next steps were carried out after they had participated in an 
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event. Adaptive Red Team is a government-funded program that is an information 
provider on developing technologies’ limitations and vulnerabilities. Adaptive Red Team 
does not provide funding for developer’s participation or vulnerability mitigation. 
However, Adaptive Red Team is an information provider in the form of executive 
summaries, quick look reports, and a final report to Adaptive Red Team sponsors and 
others within government. This information is now provided to government and industry 
developers, in bi-weekly teleconferences. Communicating this previously unknown 
information should increase collaboration, as developers are not vying for additional 
funding sources. 
Adaptive Red Team makes an attempt to decouple the company from the 
technology by not allowing banners/plaques or other branding, as the events are not trade 
shows or technology demonstrations. Adaptive Red Team uses technology names in all 
technology lists and formal outputs, but not company/organization names. This approach 
allows for all developing organizations to interact freely and feel like everyone is on the 
same team supporting the U.S. Army.  
2. Methods to Increase Collaboration 
Adaptive Red Team selects 25 technologies to participate in the weekly events. 
Previously, there were no introductions of the 25 technologies to members of the cells. 
The new Adaptive Red Team process implements a technology developer introduction. 
This two-minute introduction allows technology developers to understand what other 
participants are developing. This change provides an understanding of the other 
participants and there technologies as a first step toward future collaboration.  
During the end of day AARs, each technology debrief must include any 
collaboration attempted or accomplished. This reinforcement of sharing shows all other 
technology developers that collaboration is acceptable and highly encouraged.  
The last method implemented to increase collaboration is geared toward increasing 
collaboration from the government side. Technology integration was implemented as a way 
to increase collaboration, reduce stovepipes, and reduce costs spent on common operational 
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platforms (also known as situational awareness displays). Integration addresses the ability to 
use a common data format for information sharing that can be processed and understood by 
the common operations pictures (COP). Adaptive Red Team uses one standard in particular, 
called cursor-on-target (CoT), which was development by the U.S. Air Force. This data 
standard uses an XML schema to address information such as who, what, where, and when 






















Figure 5.  Sample CoT Schema (Kristan 2009, 2–1) 
This sample CoT schema shows the layout for a particular type of information 
(lat/log) formatted to meet CoT standards. Sample CoT schema listed below: 
• UID—Unique identification for this information that typically shows up in the 
COP next to representative icon 
• Type—this represents the type of information such as friendly force/vehicle/ 
tank getting more specific as the sting continues  
• Time—when the event was created 
• Start—time when event is valid 
• Stale—ending time when event is no longer valid 
• Point Lat—latitude 
• Lon—longitude 













• Ce—circular area around the point (if desired) 
• Hae—height above point (if desired) 
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VI. NEW ADAPTIVE RED TEAM PROCESS BASED ON 
SYSTEMS THINKING 
A. PLANNING 
The new Adaptive Red Team process takes advantage of systems thinking in 
order to address stakeholder requirements. The modified process is shown in Figure 6 
does not change the methods for technology submission and selection or planning 
meeting structure. The new process does reflect the addition of the tradespace 
methodology, EW/CNS experts, bi-weekly meetings, and, integration and additional red 
cell threat equipment. 
  
Figure 6.  Modified Planning Process based on Systems Thinking 
(from Gilkes and Klopfenstein 2014, 3–5) 
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Tradespace methodology and EW/CNS data collection plans are started at the 
initial planning meeting. Tradespace methodology will specifically address the repeatable 
process providing a quantitative snapshot of technology. The EW & CNS data collection 
plans are part of the increase threat emulation capabilities.  
The stakeholder goal to increase collaboration between government and industry 
is supported in this new process by adding Adaptive Red Team overview that addresses 
barriers to collaboration in the bi-weekly teleconferences. Integration process is also now 
discussed at the bi-weekly meetings with specifics given on CoT data standard, how to 
get access and assistance with CoT verification.  
Final planning meetings are conducted to wrap-up any last minute details on 
technology drops that lead to data collection plan and scenario modifications. A list of 
additional red assets are compiled and acquired each quarter to support the increase threat 
emulation capabilities. This equipment will allow uncovering of additional vulnerabilities 
and system limitations to meet the stakeholder requirement.  
Several items not part of process modification but required to meet stakeholder 
objectives are administrative in nature. These include the assignment of a permanent red 
cell lead instead of a rotational basis and annual training to continually to evolve this 
threat skillset.  
B. EXECUTION 
The new Adaptive Red Team execution process, as shown in Figure 7, provides 
an overview of event execution and how each cells function together. This new process 
begins with the same discovery method from the old Adaptive Red Team process, but 
combines the new tradespace methodology and EW & CNS data collection. When each 
data collection team successfully answers the list of questions in discovery, tradespace 
methodology, and EW &CNS data collection plans, they have cleared the first hurdle to 




Figure 7.  New Adaptive Red Team Execution and Cell Interaction 
(from Gilkes and Klopfenstein 2014, 3–5)  
Integration is a process that begins during the bi-weekly teleconferences when 
information is provided on the CoT data standard. Developers begin integration at their 
home stations in an effort to maximize time on the ground, so final integration and 
verification is done in parallel with the white cell data collection efforts.  
Once integration has been verified, technology training begins. This technology 
training is executed by the technology developers to the blue cell members who will be 
operating the equipment during the scenarios. When training is complete, soldiers take 
possession of the technology and begin loading it for the upcoming scenarios.  
Each scenario becomes progressively more complex from a red cell perspective, 
by utilizing enemy TTPs, new threat equipment, or exploiting a vulnerability found by 
the EW & CNS data collection team. The approach, procedures, and the complexity 
emulates real world adversaries and the equipment they use. Blue cell members are 
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provided the flexibility to adapt and try new uses for the technology as threat complexity 
increases. In some cases, technology is raised and placed on a platform at an entry control 
point out of a potential blast zone of a suicide bomber entering the compound. The now 
elevated technology is not destroyed and allows for the detection of incoming red cell 
threats. During the scenarios, white cell members continue to collect valuable 
information on how the technology did or did not perform, on the adaptability of blue cell 
members, and the techniques/equipment used by the red cell.  
This new Adaptive Red Team process allows the Adaptive Red Team to become 
truly adaptive and potentially more effective at discovering vulnerabilities.  
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VII. NEW ADAPTIVE RED TEAM PROCESS INITIAL RESULTS  
Three major process improvements to support stakeholder requirements are 
implementation of tradespace methodology, the addition of electronic warfare and 
computer network security experts, and the introduction of an integration standard.  
A. TRADESPACE METHODOLOGY INITIAL RESULTS 
Previous Adaptive Red Team assessment employed a tradespace methodology 
across all technologies. The spider chart shown in Figure 8 utilizes the averaged Most 
Likely (ML) scores for each tradespace factor—Logistical, User, and Technical—to 
expose system strengths along with possible risks requiring mitigation should the system 
be acquired in its current state of development.  
Adaptive Red Team tradespace methodology baselines average ML results by 
evaluating tradespace factors for each of the twenty-nine (29) technologies on a 100% 





Figure 8.  Adaptive Red Team event 14–2 Most Likely (ML) average per 
tradespace 
(from Klopfenstein and Tober 2014, 107–122) 
The blue line represents log factors averaged ML scores. They are averaged from 
the individual ML scores of log factors 1–6. This logistics score is plotted as the blue line 
on the spider chart for each technology. The same process is repeated for the ML user 
factor and the ML technology factor. ML user factor is compiled from the averaged 
individual scores of user factor 1–5 and plotted in red on the spider chart for each 
technology. The green line represents the technology factor and uses the averaged ML 
scores from each technology factors 1–5. Based on interpreting the above spider chart the 
following were assessed to have high likelihood of technology acceptance: 
• Expedition Recon Patrol Squad Pak (ERPS Pak) 
• Flex Fuel Generator 
• Lightweight App-enabled Computer (LWAEC) 
• Mobile Protection System Mortar Pit (MPS Mortar) 
• Panoramic Night/Day Camera (Pana ND Cam) 














































• Stalker XE UAS (Stalker XE) 
Conversely, several systems appear to require changes to accommodate 
technology acceptance: 
• Blood Hound 
• Distributed Tactical Fires (DTF) 
• Fencepost Acoustic System (FAS) 
• Human Activity Recognition in Video Streams (HARVS) 
• Level 1 Fusion in a Box (L1FB) 
• Lidar Based Facial Recognition (LIDAR) 
• Nett Warrior 
• Reconnaissance Advanced Sensor and Exploitation (RASE) 
Additional results are provided for one system that exhibited a high percentage of 
technology acceptance and one technology with a lower percentage of technology 
acceptance. Flex fuel generator scored approximately 70% technology acceptance, based 
on the three factors surveyed. LIDAR based facial recognition, which scored 
approximately 40% on the averaged ML logistics and user factors, and approximately 
60% on technology factors. 
1. Flex Fuel Generator 
Flex fuel generators (FFG) as seen in Figure 9, is a power generation capability 
that can utilize a combination of fuels for operation. This multi-fuel power source can be 
used with compressed and liquid fuels, including light and heavy distillate fuels. The 





Figure 9.  1 kW Flex Fuel Generator  
The spider chart plots the averaged ML score for each factor. This ML score may 
present some uncertainly that is captured in the estimated high (EH) score and estimated 
low (EL) score. This uncertainty is presented in Figure 10 and shows two key statistics 
for each tradespace factor.  
 
Figure 10.  Individual Tradespace Methodology subfactor assessment and 
uncertainty score (from Klopfenstein and Tober 2014, 107–122) 
The first of these key statics is simply the average most likely (AVG Most Likely) 
score for each tradespace factor. A solid bar is used to indicate the level of this measure. 
The AVG Most likely score is the average of all the data collectors score for that specific 
category (i.e., Log 1). Higher scores are associated with a greater degree of technology 
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acceptance. The second key static is the whisker plot that represents the range of 
uncertainty in the AVG Most Likely from best-case high score to worst-case low score. 
The best-case high (Best Case HI) score is the highest score, not averaged, from all data 
collectors on a given category. The worst case low (Worst Case Low) is the lowest score, 
not averaged, from all the data collectors on a given category. The shorter the black line 
the more certain the white cell is of the assessed most likely value. Log factor one, tech 
factor three and four represent almost no uncertainty from the averaged most likely score. 
Tech factor five (Tech 5) averaged most likely score is eight; the range of uncertainty for 
this category is as high as ten and as low as seven. The lowest score of all the data 
collectors estimated low (EL) is a seven with the estimated high (EH) being a ten. 
Overall, this technology has high degree of technology acceptance.  
B. ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND COMPUTER NETWORK SECURITY  
The EW & CNS team specializing in threat vulnerability analysis are part of the 
new Adaptive Red Team process to uncover vulnerabilities and system limitations.  
Utilizing the tools described above these experts assess all technologies at an 
Adaptive Red Team assessment that connect to any wireless/wired network, send/receive 
a radio signal or have incorporated a computer of any type. Vulnerability assessment 
results are provided for one technology that scored in the middle of the tradespace 
methodology.  
1. Frontier II Low Visibility Friendly Force Tracker Overview 
Frontier II, show in Figure 11, low visibility friendly force tracker (LVFFT) is a 
tagging, tracking, and locating (TTL) device primarily intended for low visibility 
applications, but can be also used for hostile force tracking (HFT) and other friendly 
force tracking (FFT) applications. Positional and sensor data are autonomously 





Figure 11.  Frontier II LVFFT Device (from Klopfenstein and Tober 2014, 107–
122) 
2. EW & CNS Assessment of the LVFFT 
EW & CNS white cell performed a passive assessment against a single Frontier II 
LVFFT laptop server running the command post software located in the operations 
center. The passive assessment included system footprinting, enumeration, and 
vulnerability scans. 
Footprinting and enumeration network scans were executed using Nmap and 
Softperfect, both of which are open source network mapping software running on 
Windows (trademarked by Microsoft Corporation) and Linux. Vulnerability scans using 
open source scanners named OpenVAS, xProbe2 and Nessus were utilized.  
Footprinting and enumerating a target system refers to the adversary’s ability to 
identify their target and gather information for an attack or escalation of an attack. From 
the Adaptive Red Team network, EW & CNS data collectors were able to locate the 
Frontier II LVFFT server using xProbe2 and Nmap. Nmap provided a network scan for 
the 192.168.112.xxx network, identifying the command post server’s Internet protocol 
(IP) address of 192.168.112.28 system. xProbe2 was then used to validate the findings.  
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Enumeration proved to be difficult as EW & CNS white cell discovered the 
system had implemented strong security measures, including port filtering. Table 4 
displays the information acquired from the port scanners. 
Table 4.   Enumeration Results for 192.168.112.28 
Host Name Open Ports MAC Address System/OS 
Mcp803800-pc.tsoa-PTR 1000: Filtered DE:BE:D9:27:04:72 Dell/Unknown 
The limited amount of information provided in Table 4 illustrates the difficulty 
enumerating the Frontier II LVFFT system, as all of the open ports were filtered and not 
reporting. EW & CNS white cell were only able to collect readily available network data, 
such as the domain name system (DNS) host name, the media access control (MAC) 
address, and the name of the manufacturer derived from the unique MAC address. 
Vulnerability validation was accomplished against the .28 system. EW & CNS 
white cell used Nessus and OpenVAS open source and commercially available 
vulnerability scanners to identify and validate exploitable vulnerabilities. 
Two informational notes and no vulnerabilities were identified. The informational 
notes further validated the enumeration findings, the DNS host server name, the MAC 
address, and the computer manufacturer. Due to the security in place, the EW & CNS 
white cell discontinued their attempt to further enumerate the Frontier II LVFFT 
command post laptop server. 
Using open source software and commercial laptops, the adversary would not be 
able to successfully enumerate the Frontier II LVFFT system. A denial of service (DoS) 
attack was not attempted on the Adaptive Red Team network. 
3. EW & CNS Assessment Summary 
Using multiple enumeration and vulnerability tools, EW & CNS white cell were 
unsuccessful in identifying exploitable vulnerabilities associated with the targeted 
system. The .28 server was secured with local security, including port filtering, which 
prevented thorough and accurate enumeration of the target system. The only findings 
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included the systems DNS host name, MAC address and manufacturer, which provided 
no actionable data for the adversary.  
This vulnerability analysis accomplished by the EW & CNS white cell is similar 
to the TTP used by our enemy to exploit our technology. Understanding the 
vulnerabilities in developmental technologies provides the developer an actionable list for 
mitigation.  
C. COLLABORATION AND INTEGRATION 
Collaboration and integration are two different components of an Adaptive Red 
Team event but both try to accomplish the stakeholder goal of increasing collaboration 
between government and industry. Some technologies have the ability to integrate in to 
the COP such as an unmanned aerial vehicles, tracking, tagging and location devices, and 
unattended ground sensors. These examples provide an output that can be consumed, 
georeferenced, and displayed in the COP.  
Collaboration is a method that shows interaction between participating 
technologies. Power sources such as generators, wind turbines, and solar panels are 
examples of technology that have high collaboration potential.  
Using two of the technologies discussed above, Adaptive Red Team initial results 
will show one integrated with the COP and the other collaborated with other developers. 
Integration is important because it allows the information flow to be standardized and 
shown on one COP. A COP is a computer running situational awareness software that is 
connected to a large display in the operations center. When all information can be shown 
on one display, this minimizes the need to look at separate computer screens to 
understand the battle flow. Potentially, this displayed information allows for quicker 
decisions and better understating of the battlefield.  
Collaboration is a way for products to become more capable by working with 
another technology developer to share resources. Collaboration occurs in many ways and 
one example is a generator developer collaborated with a power management company to 
develop a more effective power generation and management system.  
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1. Flex Fuel Generator Collaboration 
A collaboration table is created based on technology feedback from the end of day 
hot washes or individual white cell data collectors and consolidated in a single table, shown 
as Table 5.  
Table 5.   Flex Fuel Generator Collaborations Results from Adaptive Red 
Team Assessment  
Collaborated with: 
Generic name (Tech name) 
Achieved/
Attempted Comments 
Sensor Platform (Cerberus) Achieved Provided backup (only when battery/solar power was not available) to Cerberus trailer. 




FFG powered the LIDAR-Based Facial 
Recognition system overnight. The 
Expedition Pak was used as the power 
management system to ensure power 
throughout the night. 
Solar Panels (GREENS) Achieved Served as backup power for experiment. 
LIDAR-Based Facial 
Recognition Achieved FFG provided prime power at night. 
Communications Platform 
(Nett Warrior) Achieved FFG provided prime power. 
Secure Communications 
System Attempted Discussed future collaboration. 
Power Management 
Technology (Squad Power 
Manager) 
Achieved Provided input power to SPM-622 using solar 
This table represents all of the attempted or achieved collaborations for the flex 
fuel generator. These generators provided primary power to a facial recognition system 
and communications platform. Backup power was provided to system sensor platform 
named Cerberus. This technology collaborated with power management technology that 
smartly manages its input power that is supplied to a load. Using the power management 
technology, solar panel technology, and a battery backup kit, the white cell was able to 
power the facial recognition technology day and night, rain, or shine.  
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Based on this three-way collaboration described above, it was determined by the 
white cell that an auto start capability should be incorporated in the FFG. This auto start 
feature will allow the automatic recharging of batteries based on specific conditions and 
eliminate an activity that needed to be monitored.  
February 2015, INI Power Systems’ technology’s new auto-start FFG was 
selected as generator/auto start solution for Unites States Marine Corp (USMC) one-man 
portable battery charger requirement. This formal acquisition contract is for the purchase 
of 3,000 units (Markoski 2015, 1).  
2. Frontier II LVFTT 
When the Frontier technology was first selected to participate in an Adaptive Red 
Team event the product was deemed a very reliable TTL device as it used either satellite 
or cellular transmission of its information that is available coverage. The downside was 
that this device needed to communicate with the command post server. This “back” 
communication was the only way the TTL device was able to provide an output. This 
communications link was difficult to use as the blue cell commander was constantly 
turning around and taking his eyes off the COPs to look at the Frontier II command post 
software, shown in Figure 12 that displays the physical location of each device. This 
capability was hindered by the need to constantly look at a different stand-alone display 





Figure 12.  Frontier II LVFFT Control Station Software 
(from Klopfenstein and Tober 2014, 107–122) 
Finally, the technology developer was able to reformat the message using cursor 
on target. This new message format and command post server modifications allowed the 
message traffic to be shared on the Adaptive Red Team network.  
The COP picture in Figure 13 is one of the first screen captures of a Frontier TTL 
device providing CoT formatted messages to the COP. The red circles are the Frontier 
devices. Notice no name next to the icon, as they have not fully implemented the UID 





Figure 13.  COP Software Displaying New Integrated Frontier TTL Devices 





Traditional Red-teaming looks at a particular plan, document, or briefing “through 
the eyes” of the opposition or receiving agency depending on the circumstance. This 
perspective allows the organizations red-teaming output to be incorporated into the plan, 
document or briefing with the intent of being more thorough and impactful. This 
opposition’s perspective has not escaped DOD. In fact, DOD has been using red teams 
for several years to look at operations plans for use on the battlefield. This perspective is 
taught at DOD schools and educates attendees on red-teaming principles pertaining to 
operational plans.  
The challenge for Adaptive Red Team is to formulate an adaptable, repeatable 
process that uncovers vulnerabilities and limitations in technology, not operational battle 
plans, through an adversarial perspective on developmental technology.  
This development led Adaptive Red Team down a path that utilized previous 
experience and limited red-teaming knowledge to build a process for Adaptive Red Team 
to assess developmental technology. This old process was ineffective for Adaptive Red 
Team based on stakeholder feedback.  
The new Adaptive Red Team process was created using systems thinking and 
based on initial results is more effective than the previous process used for red-teaming 
developmental technologies.  
Discussion of Research Questions 
1. What are the impacts of the Adaptive Red-teaming methods on 
developmental technology? 
Developing technology for use by DOD is sometimes a difficult and challenging 
mission. All companies are in business to make money and the need to produce a useful 
product meeting a DOD need is the goal. Any advantage a company can use to make 
their technology more effective, more capable and less vulnerable to enemy TTP’s is 
generally in their best interest. This motivation drives the developers to continually 
improve the technology and mitigate the vulnerabilities discovered. Adaptive Red Team 
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routinely receives submissions from previous developers in order to validate their 
mitigation attempts, showcase a new feature from collaboration or integration effort. 
Repeat submissions are one method to gauge the developer community on the impact 
Adaptive Red Team process.  
Another method to measure the impact of Adaptive Red Team is whether DOD 
acquires an ART developmental technology through its formal acquisition. This 
acquisition process can be very rigorous and may present many challenges for solicitors 
such as key performance metrics pertaining to run-time, fuel type, output power, and 
usability with other fielded equipment. The INI generator participated in the new 
Adaptive Red Team process and was identified to have a system limitation. This 
limitation was the lack of an auto-start feature. This limitation was assessed after the 
generator collaborated with a battery kit developer. This limitation meant the generator 
had to be manually started when the batteries needed charged. The manual process meant 
a soldier had to be dedicated to watch the battery capacity and initiate the generator. The 
developer clearly felt the need to mitigate this system limitation and build an auto-start 
feature into the generator. This new capability is a major reason the USMC is acquiring 
3,000 new flex fuel generators.  
2. What value does the Adaptive Red Team process provide to developing 
defense technologies? 
The new Adaptive Red Team process of uncovering vulnerabilities and system 
limitation is an assessment venue funded by the government that invites Industry and 
government developmental technology. The value provided by this Adaptive Red Team 
ranges from having a subjective team assess the technology, soldier training, and usage of 
the technology in scenarios. The EW & CNS white cell effort has been discussed by 
developers as the second most valuable part of the new Adaptive Red Team process. The 
most valuable part of Adaptive Red Team from the developer perspective, based on 
personal feedback, is additional information obtained during the operational assessments 
collected by white cell from usage in the scenarios. This assessment is based on the 
scenarios and the combined efforts of blue and red cells. Blue cell provides feedback to 
white cell on equipment training, portability, usage, and operational effectiveness, 
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including effects from red cell. Red cell provides feedback to white cell on effectiveness 
of threat TTPs (if known) and adaptability. This value is enforced when each technology 
receives a copy of the report pertaining to their developmental technology. The feedback 
received from developers, combined with repeat submissions, provides evidence that the 
new ART process provides value to the development team. 
3. How does implementing the Adaptive Red-teaming process help DOD 
acquire defense system more efficiently? 
The new Adaptive Red Team process is executed at each quarterly event. These 
assessment events accept 25 technologies and assuming no repeats that is 100 different 
technologies each year that can be assessed by Adaptive Red Team. Those 100 
technologies will most likely all have some vulnerability or limitation. If the development 
team chooses to mitigate those vulnerabilities or limitations, the technology would 
presumably be more effective or efficient at performing the desired capability. When 
industry mitigates those vulnerabilities, they utilize internal research and development 
(IRAD) funding. Those funds are not provided by the government. If the Army or other 
service acquires any of the 100 annually assessed technology after industry mitigates the 
vulnerabilities, this act would be more efficient than the traditional process of 
government contract. In essence, fund the research and possibly procure at the end of the 
contract.  
DOD acquired the INI FFG generator by advertising on the government-
contracting website its requirements for a one-person generator. That generator 
solicitation was awarded after all submissions were evaluated and the chosen technology 
by DOD was the INI FFG generator with the new auto-start feature. The acquisition of 
3,000 FFG is further evidence of how this new process helps DOD acquire new defense 
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